Board president¹ announces hire for E.D. position, highlighting increased role for org’s shared-leadership model.

The organization had nearly three decades of sustained growth, most dramatically in the decade prior to the hiring of the new E.D. During that time, a shared leadership model (department managers) played a key role in collaboratively determining big-picture decisions.

The staff liaison to the Board search committee was told by Board officers that, while the Board acknowledged the “vision” limitations of the candidate (who becomes E.D.), it was believed that the shared leadership dynamic would help balance out the candidate’s limitations.

E.D. permanently disbands leadership team, ending co-leadership model.

In the first of many changes to institutional norms, several months after being hired, the E.D. replaces ‘leadership team’ model with an ad-hoc group of department staff that meets half as often, for half as much time. The purpose of the new, ad hoc group of staff is exclusively to provide departmental updates, and to be informed of ongoing changes determined solely by ED.

All-staff meetings cease to occur, projects canceled without discussion.

Previously, all-staff meetings often took place quarterly, or at least twice a year.

E.D. proceeds to terminate several long-term, cross-departmental projects – many of which were well underway and self-funded. Future “big picture” decisions are made without input, and only occasionally discussed in any cross-departmental setting.

Board president¹ prohibits staff, Board from seeing video interview with candidate (now E.D.) featuring unsolicited derision of staff.

Within months, two longtime staff resign, unaware they were the focus of intense derision by E.D. in an internal video the Board prevents anyone from seeing.

During the E.D. search, several months prior, the Board’s search committee attempts to include staff and other Board members, whenever possible. Interviews of finalist candidates for the E.D. position were filmed, in order to share videos of the interviews with staff and the full Board.

In the video interview, the finance director (now E.D.) makes highly derogatory comments about a few staff members, by name – referring to them as ‘dead weight’ and saying they need to go.

Before the video interviews are shared with staff and other Board members, the candidate (now E.D.) asks the Board president¹ to prohibit anyone from seeing the videos. The Board president¹ agrees, instructing the staff liaison to restrict all access to the candidate’s interview.

A few weeks later, the finance director is hired as E.D. A few months later, the staff who were disparaged in the candidate interview videos… resign, stating that the workplace had become very unwelcoming for them.

This is the beginning of a pattern of passive, yet targeted mistreatment of longtime staff — coercive use of power, as a means of prompting specific people to resign. The first two staff to depart are not asked to resign, nor are they fired. They do not leave because of an offer to work somewhere else. They leave because their work environment is made unbearable for them.

And by the end of the E.D.’s first year, there will be ten more departures that happen virtually the same way.

Staff interactions with Board restricted, eliminating another institutional norm.

For as long as anyone could remember, senior staff took turns participating in Board meetings, providing a mechanism for accountability and fluid communications. Eliminating staff interactions with Board members creates a “Catch-22,” because the Board is the only mechanism for oversight of the E.D. — and the E.D. is now the Board’s only source of information.

By eliminating monthly, in-person interactions between various managers and the Board, there is a vast degradation of accountability for the most powerful person in the organization. Aside from an annual “survey” the Board requests from department managers, preceding their E.D. performance review… the Board has no way of knowing that staff are becoming increasingly isolated, with frequent cancellations of monthly “department update” meetings, and no all-staff meetings for over a year.

As a whole, the E.D.’s changes to institutional norms result in a single individual having near total control over information, in both directions.

HR role won’t be restaffed; E.D. instructs staff, ‘Bring workplace issues to me.’

Until now, staff and volunteers had access to an HR director, separate from the leader. This is standard best practice: the availability of a neutral department to hear concerns provides a sense of safety, making it easier to come forward if one witnesses unethical behavior or experiences harassment.

Additionally, most workplace conflicts involve an employee and a supervisor, so it can have a chilling effect on workplace safety, if that supervisor is the only remedy for a vulnerable employee. Retaining control of HR issues is another layer of control over information.

Later sections summarize ways this control is misused in profoundly damaging ways. Retaliation against “whistle blowers” is widespread and poses a significant and unique barrier to the accountability and transparency of NPO leaders — the existence of this documentation is rare, because fear of reprisal gives near total control to the supervisor.

Finance Director role won’t be restaffed; E.D. restricts staff access to finances.

Despite longstanding, structural separations between the executive director and finance director roles, E.D. consolidates full and complete control over both roles, in addition to HR.

The consolidation of executive, finance and HR departments gives rise to almost every breach of ethical conduct that occurs, going forward.

The organization’s annual income is in the seven figures.

Board asks E.D. to restaff Finance Dept.; E.D. hires friend with no accounting experience, given no authority, to do entry-level tasks.

A hiring search for a replacement finance director produces two qualified candidates, E.D. ultimately decides against either candidate to fill finance director position for the $2 million organization.

E.D. contracts with a retired manufacturing worker with no prior experience in finance.This individual fulfills some basic, low-level administrative data-entry tasks.

Previously, several staff worked in departmental capacities undertaking finance duties, under the supervision of the finance director (now E.D.). A dozen staff had access to accounting software, constituting a system of checks and balances regarding payments.

Now, there is a part-time contractor who receives 100 percent of instructions and tasks solely from the E.D., who retains control over finances. In follow up reports to the Board, E.D. portrays the part-time contractor as a reasonable response to their request to hire a new finance director. With staff restricted from interacting with Board, there is nobody present to say any different.

Foundations confused after E.D. instructs them to cut ties with org’s longstanding contact; major gifts drop from six figures, to zero.

E.D. privately instructs foundation leaders to interact only with them, without telling manager who has handled major gifts for a decade. The manager has raised raised millions of dollars for the organization over the past decade. This manager begins receiving phone calls from several, confused foundation leaders and major-gifts donors. They ask why they’ve been instructed to only interact with the E.D.. One major donor says is confused by the list of items the E.D. told them they’d like funded.

The manager apologizes, having no idea what they’re talking about. The manager commits to finding answers for them, while acknowledging it is the E.D.’s prerogative to take over that role.

The manager drives to the organization’s headquarters but the E.D. is not available. The E.D.’s assistant tells the manager that it just makes more sense for the organization’s leader to have those relationships. The manager says, “That’s obviously not my decision to make, but it would’ve been helpful to have some advance notice.”

Board members try to document concerns during E.D. performance review; E.D. and Board president¹ subvert review process.

The Board performs annual E.D. performance reviews that involve the executive committee, with input taken from all Board officers — an institutional norm for over three decades. This year it was well known that several officers had serious concerns about the E.D.’s recent behavior.

Bylaws were written with general language requiring the Board to perform the review — without explicitly defining the mechanics. The E.D. convinces the Board president¹ (a driving force in the hiring of this E.D., and about to term out) to perform the review in private, before the scheduled Board meeting, without any other officers.

And that’s what happened. The Board president¹ starts the next Board meeting by handing officers copies of the E.D. evaluation, and it’s a glowing review. It contains none of the concerns other Board members had been expressing at previous Board meetings. It’s already signed and filed: it cannot be altered.

Board members vocalize concerns, protesting the unprecedented departure from the long established process for evaluating E.D. performance. The E.D. leveraged a lack of specificity in the bylaws in order to avoid critical comments from becoming part of their permanent record.

This binding review would have profound ripple effects, going forward. In fact, some future corrective efforts would be subverted entirely on the basis of this first, glowing review.

Unprecedented number of resignations occur in E.D.’s first year, totaling 100 years of institutional knowledge.

The dozen senior staff who depart in the executive director’s  first 10 months exceeds the total number for ten years prior. The majority of the departures involve women and other minority groups, many of whom are managers. A number of staff who resign have no contingency plan (e.g. alternative employment). In almost every case, targeted mistreatment is the primary reason for the resignations. Coercive power is brought to bear, to push the staff out, one by one. Replacements are less self-directed and less well paid. Departments that once had stable management for 5-10 years now experience new management annually.

Board has no idea why so many resignations are occurring; E.D. is nearly their only source of information, now.

Universally, one by one, staff departures are explained to the Board (by the executive director) as some version of “moving on to their next adventure,” or involving ancillary reasons (e.g. children, hobbies, etc.) unrelated to the actual conflicts or frustrations prompting the resignations. And nobody could say different, with human resources controlled by the executive director, and staff prohibited from official interactions with Board members. In summary, staff are so vulnerable that leaving is their only means of safety — and they’re further victimized when their motives (for leaving) are distorted, as the cause of the dysfunction controls the flow of information.

An exodus of skilled and experienced leaders who knew what they were doing, causing an erosion of expertise. This has profound implications for the greater community, and especially the most vulnerable populations served by the organization.

Aside from an annual survey sent to managers, staff have nearly no way of interacting with the Board, vastly degrading their access to real time information about conditions in the workplace.

Board president² requests ‘exit interview’ with manager who resigns; E.D. gives Board false information, preventing exit interview.

Having eliminated most interactions between the Board and staff, the E.D. is the only source of information between both groups.

The Board has some awareness, by this point, of the alarming rate of resignations that are occurring. When a well-known manager announces their resignation, the Board asks the E.D. for some elaboration. The manager had communicated comprehensive objections in writing to the E.D. However, the Board was told that (the manager) was “moving on to a new chapter.”

When Board president² asks E.D. to arrange an exit interview with the manager, the E.D. falsely claims there may be some legal actions involving the manager; therefore, for legal reasons, nobody can interact with the manager for the time being. The E.D. promises to provide updates and to let the Board know when an exit interview might be plausible. (There were never any legal actions from either the manager or the E.D. The exit interview never happens.)

With fundraising in sharp decline, E.D. stops announcing goals in advance; goals now reported retroactively, based on outcomes.

Meaning, the Board only sees successful outcomes.

By the end of the E.D.’s first year, major gifts plummet to zero and stay there. In addition, outcomes from the organization’s two yearly fundraising events are spiraling downward, dropping 15-25 percent every six months. By comparison, for the past several years, public fundraising campaigns exceed their goals significantly, every time.

Staff with access to internal donor-management software start to notice the internal funding goals being revised upon completion of campaigns and events. (Starting goals are necessary for the software to initiate a ‘campaign’ – but, the goals are changed internally, by the E.D., before the Board ever sees the outcomes.)

As a result, when the E.D. reports outcomes to the Board, the sky is not falling, because goals and totals are aligned. Since staff are prohibited from interacting with Board members, the E.D. has complete control over information used by the Board to judge the success or failure of development efforts.

As “constructive dismissals” increase tenfold, senior staff are replaced by less diverse workers with limited knowledge of institutional history.

The cycle of resignations and re-staffing accelerates every year, going forward. Some department manager positions become vacant multiple times per year, going forward.

Again, this organization previously had developed a unique reputation for retention of senior management. Despite a robust, reliable funding model, and nearly a million dollars in reserves, wages remain remarkably stagnant. Coupled with dysfunctional leadership, the poor retention of qualified, experienced staff becomes increasingly problematic.

Quotes by E.D. in magazine distort recent history, creating negative controversy; publication makes rare, formal correction.

A highly regarded magazine gives E.D. a coveted feature interview. Shortly after the print edition is out, a number of local leaders highlight multiple quotes by E.D. taking credit for the accomplishments of previous leaders. Additionally, certain quotes by E.D. create confusion among staff: it is stated that staff urged the E.D. to apply for the job, when it became available. (“I hadn’t even considered applying for the job, but they wanted me to do it.”) In contrast, staff were actually quite surprised when they heard the list of applicants for the first time.

The magazine’s publisher was a longtime supporter of the organization, and a previous Board member. Little scrutiny was given to the E.D.’s responses to the interviewer’s question. After the magazine went to print, a number of community members posted public criticisms of the article, describing it as manipulative and self-serving. The individuals who shared public criticisms of the article are well-known community members and leaders – if anything, their criticism were notable because these were people who didn’t normally say such things.

The publication ultimately took the unprecedented step of issuing a correction and removing the original article from its online archive. However, the E.D. would consistently repeat theses behaviors, re-engineering organizational history in future anniversaries and celebrations of past achievements by the organization, omitting entire groups of people who collaborated in accomplishments.

E.D. halts practice of engaging managers in creating their own department’s budgets. One manager makes a troubling discovery.

For the past decade, department managers create proposed annual budgets for the upcoming year. The E.D. has final approval, but, input by managers was key to this process.

The new E.D. halts this practice, entirely removing department managers from the budget planning process — entirely within a leader’s prerogative, but, a departure from institutional norms and damaging to systems of accountability.

The manager who used to coordinate major gifts sees red flags in a reference to grant money “already received,” because the organization promised foundations that diversity funds would be held in a sub-account and dispersed as used. The E.D. (in their previous role as finance director) had been part of the advance discussions about this promise to foundations.

Asked about this, the E.D. said they never agreed to receive grant funds this way. Furthermore, the E.D. goes on to say, the manager never received permission in the first place, to *write the grant request.*

The manager says they’ll check their notes about that – ultimately discovering long email threads with the E.D., when the manager asked for and received permission to write the grant requests, and to receive funds incrementally.

E.D. ignores bylaws, pays $5,000 for services to Board member who later becomes Board president⁴ and key ally to E.D.

A manager discovers a record of a $5,000 payment for services by a Board member. The check is created, printed and signed by E.D.

The manager who discovers this payment recently had been denied a request to pay $250 to a different Board member, for photography services during a grant-funded event. The E.D. told the manager that Board members could not be paid under any circumstances, as it would violate bylaws.

The Board member who received the $5,000 payment for services would go on to become Board president – and an unwavering ally of the E.D. While a number of actions by the E.D. fall within a leader’s normal prerogative, this payment was unequivocally inappropriate, based on the E.D.’s reasons for denying the smaller, $250 payment for services by another board member.

The E.D. engages in further inappropriate behavior with regard to the Board member who received the payment for services. The E.D. later would pressure a department manager to make inappropriate concessions to this Board member (who becomes Board president⁴) regarding the usage of services reserved for a community member. The E.D. wanted the manager to cancel the existing reservation and give it to this Board member. In addition, the E.D. would go on to serve on the board for the future Board president’s own nonprofit.

These quid-pro-quo actions by the E.D. unequivocally paid off. Board president⁴ would go on to reliably advocate for E.D. initiatives, including changes to bylaws – using the position to dismiss criticisms and challenges by other Board members.

The manager who discovers the $5,000 payment brings their concerns to the E.D. directly. Within weeks, this manage’s department is subject to a fruitless audit and their access to accounting software is revoked by the E.D.

A new Board president² issues directive outlining required areas of improvement; E.D. leverages org resources to subvert this effort.

Ripple effect from the E.D. manipulating their first performance review (Section 9, above.) In summary, Section 9 describes how the E.D. privately convinces the Board president¹ to perform the evaluation without involving any other Board members — an unprecedented development, with the effect of negating serious concerns of several officers. Furthermore, the glowing review is like a “get out of jail free card” when future Board members express concerns about the E.D.

This is how the E.D. quashed the 90-day timeline for “areas of improvement” outlined by the Board. The only thing in the E.D.’s personnel file is a glowing review. The outside advisor tells the Board they could not impose the disciplinary measures — in large part because, the E.D. had a very positive performance review (performed alone by the outgoing Board president who was the E.D.’s staunchest advocate during the E.D. search.)

Board president² resigns in frustration over subverted corrective efforts.

Board president² has nearly 20 years of institutional knowledge, as a longtime member, producer and former employee of the organization. They helped recruit a number of diverse professionals to the Board, several of whom have resigned in frustration over the increasing powerlessness of the Board.

E.D. directs staff to invoice foundation for an amount 1,000 percent above listed rates. Manager voices concerns to E.D. directly.

The organization hosts a community gathering as part of a grant program, on a Monday afternoon. Space usage fees are very standardized. This particular usage would’ve cost $450. However, the E.D. instructs the department manager’s staff to invoice the grant fund for over $4,000. The E.D. does not include the manager on the instructions to the department staff.

The department’s staff inform the manager of the irregular pricing directive. The manager assures staff they were correct to bring it up. The manager affirms that staff cannot create invoices that are fraudulent. The manager drives across town to E.D.’s office – explaining directly to E.D. why they never could bill for such an amount. The manager tells the E.D. that the department cannot be responsible for overcharging a foundation grant. The manager says the E.D. can create invoices however they see fit, but the department has to apply fees the same way for everyone.

The E.D. says “Okay,” and the conversation ends.

A week later, while making account entries, the manager’s staff sees the invoice for the community gathering, in the accounting database – overcharging for usage by nearly 1,000 percent.

E.D. retaliates against manager who voiced concerns about 1,000 percent overcharge to foundation, ordering internal audit of his department’s pricing strategies.

A week after a manager expresses concerns privately to E.D., an outside auditor is assigned to the manager, to “verify questionable and unprofitable pricing strategies.”

This particular manager supervises the organization’s community spaces. The manager spent nearly two years acquiring a liquor license for the organization, securing pro bono legal services from relatives. The manager and staff worked hard to find “goldilocks” pricing margins, that benefited the organization, yet was affordable for guests. Profits on alcohol sales were outstanding.

Yet, the retaliatory “audit” begins with the premise that liquor sales are losing money, due to mismanagement and unwise pricing of alcohol. The auditor is someone extremely well regarded in the nonprofit community, whose reputation is beyond reproach. After several days, the auditor realizes that the E.D. (who is also the finance director) had created erroneous reports: the E.D. had reversed the profit and loss columns in the report they created.

The auditor adjusts the reports created by the E.D. – concluding the manager’s original assertion was 100 percent correct. The alcohol sales had been realizing profits in excess of 200 percent.

Once it’s clear that the audit stems from a reversal of “profit” and “loss” columns in E.D.’s accounting methods, the auditor says, “I think I see what’s happening.”

The manager asks what (the auditor) means, assuming it’s a reference to the mistaken accounting methods the E.D. provided.

In an unexpected moment of candor, the auditor tells the manager, “Well, I think we both know she’s had it in for you, for a while.”

This is one of just three times that someone in a position of authority confirms what the manager was experiencing.

E.D. instructs admin staff to begin receiving diversity grant funds by identifying past usages by *any* African American users and applying ‘enhanced’ fees to settled invoices.

Department manager (former Major Gifts contact person for organization) had developed original grant funding to augment usage fees for low-income, African-American community members who lived in the venue neighborhood.

In an effort to receive the final half of the remaining Diversity grant funds, E.D. instructs manager to identify “prior usages by African-American community members” and “find ways to enhance staffing costs for items or services to their invoices.” One example of such “enhanced” pricing included higher fees for “monitoring” such events, in case there was bad behavior by producers or participants.

Manager expresses concerns about any such efforts, explaining directly to E.D. that it would violate the most fundamental language of the agreement, as well as generally violating ethical invoicing practices.

E.D. agrees with manager about halting the ‘enhanced’ invoicing of African American users.

(Section 22: E.D. quietly *continues* process of ‘enhanced’ invoicing of African American users.

Manager seeks input from foundation leader regarding ongoing ethical breaches; leader advises against direct interaction with Board, due to governance model.

The governance model leaves full discretion with the E.D. regarding staff communications with the Board. The E.D. has eliminated the majority of normal, recurring interactions between staff and the Board. The manager, following the advice of the foundation leader, has to wait for the Board to initiate any interactions.

That doesn’t happen until the manager resigns (Section 27). And, even after the Board requests an interview, the E.D. leverages organizational resources to subvert the requested exit interview with the Board (Section 28).

Board officer warns manager, “You’re being set up,” after E.D. tells Board of another planned audit – focusing on the efficacy of past renovations.

Board officer is one of the city’s most successful, female business leaders, who works in a specific industry largely dominated by men. She tells manager she has seen this before: E.D. is setting a ‘trap.’ The second audit against the manager – like the first one, months earlier – immediately follows the manager expressing concerns to E.D. privately, about potential violations of funding agreements.

In other words, the manager (again) expresses concerns directly to the E.D., and the E.D. (again) initiates a retaliatory audit premised on manager’s “bad strategies in use of grant funds.”

This particular manager has led their department for a decade, beginning with annual income of about $1,000 – raising the annual income to over $165,000 in the course of one decade. A key part of this success involved early implementation of greening technologies, which reduce operating costs. The department implemented the nation’s first solar array in a historic venue, and became the first historic venue in North America to convert 100 percent to LED stage lighting. These improvements were possible through donations.

Now, several years later, the E.D. assigns a contract worker (with no accounting experience) to audit the returns of the greening upgrades, operating with the default assumption that it has been a waste of money — this is the narrative the E.D. has begun to raise with the Board, prompting the Board officer to warn the manager about the pending (second) audit.

The audit confirms the comprehensive upgrades are providing compelling reductions in energy expenses.

Contractor performing targeted audit reveals they’ve been tasked by E.D. with continuing to apply ‘enhanced’ fees for past African-American users.

During the multi-day ‘audit’ of greening investments (which ultimately confirms the investments are doing everything they were intended to) the contractor makes offhand reference to another project, assigned by the E.D. — making the account entries to events produced by African American users. The manager had told the E.D. these retroactive adjustments were unethical. The E.D. said it would not happen anymore.

Now, a contractor in the finance department had confirmed, inadvertently, that ‘enhanced’ fees were still being applied.

Publicly visible manager resigns in objection to misuse of grant funds, hoping this will prompt Board to request an exit interview. Two other staff resign the same afternoon.

The department manager sends the E.D. a three-page resignation letter at 3:33 p.m. At 3:34 p.m. (one minute later) E.D. replies, “Thanks for letting me know.”

The manager decides to stay on for four weeks, in order to provide whatever help is desired to prepare the organization for a successful transition.

The next day, the manager will receive a call from a staff member recently hired by E.D., who tells him the monthly department manager meeting is canceled. The manager uses the time to drive to the organization headquarters — hoping to touch bases with a few other department managers, about ongoing projects.

The manager arrives to discover the monthly meeting hasn’t been canceled: it’s actually underway. Several staff later tell the manager they asked the E.D. to explain the manager’s reasons for resigning — E.D. instructs them not to speak with the department manager, for the next month.

Manager’s “Hail Mary” resignation proves successful: Board president³ makes formal request for exit interview. However, E.D. forces Board to cancel exit interview.

Several Board members express concerns about official explanation from E.D. regarding three staff resignations in one day. The E.D.’s written explanation (to the Board) about three recent resignations grossly misrepresents reasons for each staff member’s departure: varying themes of “moving on to their next adventure.”

Board president³ asks the most publicly visible manager for an exit interview, to understand why a dozen staff have resigned in such a short time span. E.D. leverages organization resources to secure legal representation that forces the Board to withdraw the request for an exit interview.

E.D. then informs the manager (on the manager’s final day) there won’t be full payment for the time-off benefits the manager didn’t use. The manager has worked 50-70 hours per week with nearly no time off. E.D. informs manager the payout will be for half the actual, accrued time off. E.D. references a section in an employee handbook that nearly nobody has seen (there’ve been no all-staff meetings in almost two years.)

This is the same manager who was audited twice in retaliation for expressing concerns (directly to the E.D.) about potentially unethical directives. The same manager who was resigning in protest of inappropriate use of grant funds and mistreatment of workers and volunteers. Cutting the PTO in half was only the beginning of a long series of harmful actions against the manager, that would last several years after the manager resigned.

Two local leaders individually post on org’s social media, asking for an explanation about the wave of recent resignations. E.D. deletes both individual’s posts.

The two individuals who posted questions (about recent resignations) are highly regarded culture leaders in the city. One is a highly successful Latinx leader, the other is a member of the local symphony. They posted their questions on the org’s main social media platform, on Facebook. The organization advocates for free expression. It is, in fact, the mission of the organization.

Within hours, both of posts (respectfully asking for more information, about recent resignations) are deleted.

Twice in two days, E.D. is spotted encircling workspace of former manager; then, a manager newly hired by E.D. begins a series of harassing actions.

The former manager begins working (alone) in an abandoned space, donated by a community member. Shortly thereafter, the former manager notices the E.D. walking in circles around the entire building. This happens twice. Then, the former manager sees the E.D. dining across the street, at a table with a window looking down on the former manager’s space.

Later this same week, the former manager occasionally hears banging on the door, but finds nobody outside. Then, hearing more banging on the door, the former manager jumps up and runs to open it – seeing a newly hired manager from the organization, and another individual. They were both running to their car, laughing.

“I was actually standing there, waving, thinking they’d come by to say hello,” the former manager says. “It only took a few moments to realize, as they sped away in their car, that it was something else.”

Former manager’s family is kicked off Medicaid after state agency sends five unanswered requests to org asking to confirm that the former manager no longer works there.

The former manager had received a warning letter from DHHS stating they could not confirm the status of employment at the organization. The former manager meets with a DHHS case worker to affirm they’re not employed by that organization any longer.

The case worker calls up records on their computer, verifying that numerous fax transmissions had been sent to the organization’s headquarters. The records indicated that each of the fax transmissions were successfully received by the organization. None of the requests by DHHS had been answered by the organization. The response consists of checking a box and faxing the form back to DHHS.

The organization owns an elaborate system for sending and receiving fax communications, with dedicated landlines at both of its locations, on either side of town. A lot of the organization’s communications require this secure form of transmission, especially with state agencies.

This creates a dangerous situation for the former manager with regard to their family and children, who now have no healthcare.

E.D. retains city’s second largest law firm to initiate legal actions against former manager — accusing them of stealing a number of items from the org.

“My son signed for the letter, which arrived by certified mail, so he was curious about what it was all about,” the former manager says. “I just kept re-reading the letter from the law firm, hoping it would say something different, if I read it enough times.”

The former manager did, in fact, have one of the items in his possession – the most expensive item on the list, a laptop computer. On the former manager’s last day, after they resigned in protest of the misuse of grant funds, the Board president told them to keep the laptop, in an email communication.

Former manager seeks guidance from Board president³ about how to stop the retaliation against him. Board president³ (disappointed to learn these things are happening) intervenes on the former manager’s behalf, with E.D.

Board president³ reveals to former manager, E.D. previously raised idea (to Board) of retaining a law firm, to ‘go after’ the former manager ‘for stealing some things’ from the venue they managed. Board leadership promptly told E.D. to do no such thing.

Former manager confirms that E.D. did retain a law firm, providing Board president³ with the letter from law firm. Board president³ offers to email the lead attorney, directly, to instruct them to go no further with the legal action against the former manager.

Re. DHHS, former manager explains to Board president³ that copies of the requested form ought to exist in the fax machine’s logs. Board president³ assures the former manager they’ll have the E.D. find the form and check the box, confirming the manager no longer works at the organization. This enables the former manager to begin the process of re-applying for their family to be covered by Medicaid (a lengthy process.)

Board president³ resigns after resolving acts of retaliation by E.D. against former manager — clearing way for Board member to whom E.D. cut a $5,000 check (in violation of bylaws) to become Board president⁴.

Section 15 (above) describes how staff saw red flags when E.D. cuts $5,000 check to a Board member: this same Board member becomes Board president⁴ after Board president³ resigns in objection to E.D. mistreatment of staff.

E.D. gains a staunch ally as Board president. By this point, the entire Board has been remade. There’s nearly no institutional knowledge or history. And no one questioning anything the E.D. does.

After Board president³ communicates to law firm (that the former manager did not steal anything) the former manager visits the law firm, to be sure the matter is resolved.

The former manager has a good relationship with one of the partners at the law firm the E.D. retained to initiate legal action against the manager. The attorney confirms the letter from Board president³ arrived. The former manager tells the attorney there’s an item listed in the letter that was sent out for repair, sometime during the manager’s last month at the org (the former manager provides the address of the repair shop.) Then, the former manager asks the attorney a simple question.

“Why didn’t someone just text me, if they thought something was missing?” the former manager asks the attorney. “Taking legal action against is really confusing, and honestly, humiliating – my son signed for that letter, because I wasn’t home.”

The attorney (who has known the former manager for decades) paused, then answered.

“All I can tell you is, I suggested that (someone just ask you about it),” the attorney says. “It became clear pretty quick that (the E.D.) wanted to initiate this specific action against you, rather than any alternative, so that’s what we did.”

The former manager asked if everything was settled, now. The attorney said they got the confirmation from the Board president³ that the laptop was a gift from the Board, verifying the former manager hadn’t stolen it.

The family of the organization’s founder, aware of ongoing E.D. misconduct, prohibits org from further use of the family name — E.D. grossly misrepresents this unprecedented development to staff and Board.

Family of organization’s founder makes unprecedented decision to prohibit use of the late founder’s name, and the family name, in any future communications or fundraising efforts. This decision came about because of the E.D.’s mistreatment of recently departing staff, and other breaches of ethical conduct experienced by the recently resigned Board president³.

The E.D. informs staff the organization no longer will use the founder’s name in its visual identity. E.D. represents this decision as their own vision/choice, saying, “We need to stop looking backward at the past, and we need to look forward, to the future.”

No staff were aware (at that time) that there was no decision to be made; rather, it was a legal prohibition of the use of the founder’s name. And, due to the unraveling of accountability mechanisms, and the consolidation of power, no one could tell staff, volunteers or Board members any differently.

E.D. coordinates 10-year anniversary celebration of a program created by former manager, actively eliminating all references to the former manager.

A manager who resigned in objection to financial decisions by E.D. had helped lead a department to a place of cultural importance in the community. One of the most challenging and successful programs co-created by the former manager, and a local business leader, was about to celebrate a 10-year anniversary. The org operates a digital publishing platform that was used to create internal marketing for the anniversary event.

Over two dozen individuals were thanked in the marketing materials for the anniversary event. The former manager was not mentioned.

Several community members contacted the org’s publication, requesting this to be corrected by including some mention of the former manager’s name. The staff who created the marketing materials knew the former manager had co-created the program, and they corrected the article.

Later that same day, the E.D. instructed the publication’s staff to re-remove the reference to the former manager.

E.D. convinces Board (now mostly allies with limited institutional knowledge) to add bylaws that are punitive to past, present and future staff.

Board president⁴ (a staunch ally of the E.D.) motions for several fundamental changes to the organization’s bylaws. The first is designed to protect the E.D. from the dozen+ senior staff who’ve resigned since the E.D. began their tenure. The new bylaw specifically prohibits former employees from being nominated, or serving on the Board of Directors, for at least two years after their departure. The conflict of interest policy now states that the former staff, after a two year waiting period, must have also left “in good standing,” making it difficult for former staff to serve the organization on the board if any problems were had with the E.D. — a cause of many recent departures.

The second successful change to bylaws requires new employees to sign away their rights to fundraise after they leave the organization, for a period of no less than two years. This change is in response to the rumors that several former staff have experienced success in developing funds for other organizations, after they were pushed out the door by the E.D. The organization has remained at $0 in major gifts since the E.D. took over development from a manager who had brought in six-figures annually for the organization.

It is unknown whether precedent exists, for requiring employees to sign away their right to serve on the Board, or do fund-raising, after they leave the organization. Perhaps there are some examples, nationally, involving highly paid development coordinators, who develop seven- or eight-figure annual totals. But while the E.D. is paid a competitive salary (statewide) the average salary for *staff* is under $30,000.

So, for staff working at or just over the poverty line, it could be considered a significant impediment to their livelihood, to be forced to enter a binding, legal agreement… that restricts their ability to work elsewhere, in any capacity that involves fund-raising.

Board president⁴ (hand picked by E.D.) approaches former manager at a ballet event — calling the former manager “weak.”

Unsure how to respond to the unexpected, unsolicited comment by Board president⁴, the former manager switches conversation to previous collaborative projects the two of them worked on, together. The former manager reminds the Board president⁴ that they know each other.

Board president⁴ then tells the former manager, “You seem like someone who has been abused, are you telling me that you have been abused?”

The former manager is again unsure how to respond.

E.D. decides against re-staffing key department but maintains its online presence, as if it still existed.

Among limited new content in 2020 is a publicly criticized op-ed from a religious organization, claiming that COVID-19 is “part of God’s plan.”

The neglected department was the brainchild of the previous E.D. whose legacy has been systematically negated by the E.D. from the start (see Section 15).

A department’s office space in largely black neighborhood is leased to an “outreach to inner city” church.

A sublease gives legal ownership to a group. In this case, a third-party, religious organization, that is the only community organization that has the rights to the space, now. That deprives others of access to it, which is another example of how the community loses, when dysfunction overtakes the nonprofit workplace. And it’s an example of bad judgment, because the organization operates a liquor license, and churches have special standing in the approval process for liquor licenses. Any subleasing tenant could use this to their advantage, in renegotiating rates.

Organization fires longtime volunteer (a senior citizen who is actively receiving treatment for Stage III cancer) for making a suggestion about popcorn.

This event may sound like a cynical summary of an otherwise more complex situation. It’s actually exactly like it sounds. Furthermore, this development is an example of the finality of any decision made by leadership, with no structure for other input, appeal or correction.

As leadership increasingly micro-manages volunteers (most of whom have been with the organization for the better part of a decade) extensive “closing” duties are posted and made a “requirement.” Furthermore, leadership frequently has friends and acquaintances supervise volunteers, during events.

On the day the volunteer “fired,” leadership had instructed volunteers to bag up popcorn for the intermission of the event at the venue. Volunteers asked if they could wait until closer to the intermission, in order to provide guests with fresher, warm popcorn. The volunteers do this sort of thing a lot, with years of events under their belt.

The new supervisor instructs them to do as they are told.

The senior volunteer suggests that they would be able to keep up with flow of people, and bag up the popcorn while it’s fresh. The volunteer is then instructed to follow the supervisor into the office. A few minutes later, the senior volunteer goes back to the concessions area, and collects her belongings.

“Wait, where are you going?” the other volunteers ask.

“I just got fired,” the senior volunteer says.

Former manager is contacted by past acquaintance, who informs the manager: the org’s leadership openly told them the manager had embezzled funds.

Within weeks, another community member would reach out, with a similar account: they were attending an event, and they were told the former manager had been fired, for stealing.

The next month, an artist performing at the venue would reach out to the former manager, saying that leadership had warned them against doing projects with the former manager.

Former manager is contacted by a dozen more random people who had interactions with the org, and were told the manager had embezzled, should be avoided, etc.

The random communications occurred so many times, the former manager could tell from the very first sentence, the person was about to describe an experience with the org’s staff describing the manager as a thief, and a bad person.

The former manager, once deeply engaged in the city, begins to completely withdraw from interactions with community members.

Mid-2020, group of former Board presidents, workers, volunteers and community members co-sign documentation and plead with senior community leaders to intervene.

Eighteen community stakeholders co-sign a letter accompanying a timeline of events, detailing abuses of power and dysfunctional leadership that are damaging the organization. The documentation is sent privately to senior leaders in the municipal and philanthropic sectors. No actions are taken to address or take seriously the alleged misuses of power by the organization’s leadership.

Somehow, E.D. acquires a copy of the documentation alerting senior leadership to abuses of power; E.D.’s friends and associates begin harassing co-signers.

A co-signer, harangued by a close associate of the E.D., reports the E.D. has acquired a full list of all co-signers of the confidential communication (sent privately to leaders in the municipal and philanthropic sectors.)

Dept. managers are given survey for input as part of annual review; one manager’s responses are flagged by Board.

New manager, unaware of history of control of messaging to Board from staff, fills in annual survey for managers with concerns; their responses are flagged by Board. The manager expresses concerns about a lack of support, unclear expectations, and a need for greater transparency.

The Board’s executive committee later asks the manager to meet with them directly. The manager expresses additional concerns about gender bias experienced in meetings involving other managers – stating their ideas often are disregarded, but the same ideas are embraced when expressed by male managers. The manager notes the lack of an HR representative who could receive staff concerns.

Some Board members express confusion, dismissing the manager’s concerns outright, stating, “The E.D. spoke so highly of you; this must be a miscommunication.”

Another Board member calls into question the trustworthiness of the manager’s perception of reality, asking, “What was your interview process like? Surely, if you had an inkling about any of this, you wouldn’t have taken the job.”

Hearing nothing from Board, manager who met with exec. committee expresses concerns to E.D. directly.

Receiving no guidance or updates from the Board re. their concerns, the manager explains ongoing challenges to the E.D. in an email. The manager reiterates the lack of support (tools, technology, staff vacancies) and unclear expectations re. their department – also mentioning the perceived gender bias that has been experienced during meetings.

The E.D. responds defensively (by email) stating they are “baffled” by these concerns, saying they “bend over backward for the entire organization.” The manager points out that the E.D. ought to be trying to hear them, rather than telling them the concerns are baseless.

E.D. meets with manager about their concerns, accompanied by someone introduced as the HR director.

Within a few weeks of the manager expressing concerns directly to the E.D. and the Board’s executive committee, the E.D. schedules a meeting with the manager. Accompanying the E.D. is a longtime friend recently hired as part-time finance director. The part-time finance director is introduced as the HR director.

The manager was unaware the organization had a HR director – and surprised when the person introduced with that title advocates against them, dismissing their claims. As the manager attempted to iterate their concerns, the person introduced as HR director interrupted them, saying the manager’s experiences never happened: “I’m in most of the meetings you are, and I’ve never seen that happen.”

The manager pointed out, they’re working over 60 hours per week, and many meetings happen outside of the finance director’s 25 hours per week. The manager questioned whether the finance director had training or experience in human relations, noting the frequent interjections as the manager was mid-sentence, and the repeated dismissals of all claims of bias expressed by the manager.

The E.D. then asked the manager directly: “Where do we go from here? Are you able to be happy in this position – as you’ve made your discomfort quite known. Are you able to submit to my leadership? Because, I am the boss, and I’m not going anywhere.”

The manager finds themselves in an unexpected role: being expect expected to resolve the HR issues caused by the E.D.’s lack of direction. The manager ask the E.D. to provide clear expectations to ensure there are no further misunderstandings. The E.D. says that is an unrealistic expectation.

E.D. fires manager who recently expressed ethics concerns to the Board.

One week after their last meeting, the E.D. meets with the manager who made an ethics complaint to the Board. The E.D. is accompanied, again, by the part-time finance director / human relations director.

The E.D. and HR director cite recent concerns expressed by the manager as “a pattern of disparaging comments.” They tell the manager they’re going to terminate their employment. This decision by the E.D. will create another vacancy in the department, and another manager position with uniquely fast turnover.

The E.D. and HR director offer the manager a cash severance for signing a letter of resignation – which they have written, themselves, and signed already. The cash offer for signing a resignation letter includes a NDA, preventing the manager from ever speaking about the cash payment. They also agreed not to contest an unemployment claim, as long as the manager signed the resignation letter, rather than be terminated.

They give the manager four days to decide whether to sign it.

The manager said they had no intention of signing the letter because it’s untruthful. The HR director interjected, “Are you sure? Do you want to read the agreement before you decide not to sign it? If you don’t sign the letter, you don’t get your money.”